ENACTING COMPETITIVE WARS: COMPETITIVE ACTIVITY, LANGUAGE GAMES, AND MARKET CONSEQUENCES
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The story reported above seems to seamlessly blend images of a war conflict with those of inter-firm rivalry. For observers of competitive dynamics in the soft drinks industry this blending is hardly surprising. The metaphor of "war" has been frequently invoked to describe the competitive interactions between the two arch-rivals in the industry. The "cola wars" themselves are perhaps the best known example of a frequently observed competitive phenomenon, e.g. the "burger wars", the "ice-cream wars", and the "Internet-browser wars." Despite its frequent occurrence in markets, the phenomenon of competitive wars has received limited research attention. More importantly, whereas the above example shows how readily and amply firms engaged in competitive warfare use war-related symbols, current theoretical approaches to the topic tend to ignore the role of language in the conduct of competitive wars.
Rooted in industrial organization economics and game theory, current approaches equate competitive wars with excessive (and therefore, destructive) rivalry (Porter, 1980; Smith, Grimm, and Gannon, 1992) , and focus their efforts on understanding the antecedents and consequences of such extreme competitive behavior (Netter, 1982; Porter, 1985; Slade, 1989) . As a result, less research attention has been focused on the processes through which competitive wars unfold. In particular, the prevailing views have not accounted for the effects of the war language used by rivaling firms on their ability to mobilize resources and influence stakeholders.
Although competitive wars have not been examined through linguistic lenses, a growing body of research views discourse as one of the primary means for analyzing organizational phenomena (Grant, Keenoy, Oswick, 1998; . Researchers interested in language and discourse have demonstrated how organizational conversations, texts, accounts, narratives, and stories (Elsbach, 1994; Ford & Ford, 1995; Philips, 1995; Dunford & Palmer, 1996; Hatch, 1993 Hatch, , 1997 Keenoy, Oswick, & Grant, 1997; Lametz & Baum, 1998; Hardy, Palmer, & Philips, 2000; Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001 ) affect the ability of organizations to take actions, achieve legitimacy, and manage their relationship with their environments. Researchers working from this perspective have recognized that language and actions are closely related because language defines certain actions as "legitimate, necessary, and may be even …the only 'realistic' option for a given situation" (Dunford & Palmer, 1996: 97) , and because people "do not use language primarily to make accurate representations of perceived objects, but, rather to accomplish things" (Alvesson & Käremann, 2000: 137) .
In this paper we build on these discursive approaches by using Wittgenstein's ideas of "language games" to develop a model of how competitive wars are enacted. Wittgenstein (1953: 4) defined language games as "language and the actions into which it is woven." He stressed that: "the term "language-game" is meant to bring into prominence the fact that "the speaking of a language is a part of an activity, or a life form" (Wittgenstein, 1953: 10[italics in the original] ). By participating in a language game, social actors pragmatically coordinate their activities through the language they use (Shotter, 1997) . In a language game words provide a practical guide for action, rather than images, associations, and representations, from which meanings are to be made. The meaning of the words is defined "by reference to their role in the fabric of human action, as opposed to, say their being associated with internal images" (Perry, 1994) . Thus, the concept of a "language game" differs from other approaches to language in its emphasis one the immediacy of the relationship between words and actions, and on the ingrained, potentially subconscious, understanding of the meaning of words
as 'knowing what to do' in a given context.
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The integrative model we propose draws both on research on competitive wars in industrial organization economics and strategy (Porter, 1985; Smith, et al., 1992) , and on linguistic theories of how language and discourse organize experience and reality (Wittgenstein, 1953; Searle, 1969) .
Consistent with the traditional approach to competitive wars, we view them as periods of intensified competitive activity among rivals that tend to occur in industries with oligopolistic structures (Porter, 1985; Smith, et al., 1992) . Drawing on Wittgenstein's ideas of a language games (Wittgenstein, 1953) , we argue the competitive activity is given "war-like" properties through the words firms use to describe it, and, that the descriptions firms use, generate the observable competitive behaviors that past research has defined as "war." Therefore, in our view, competitive wars are enacted not only through intensified competitive interactions, but also through communication acts, which create a social reality that did not exist prior to their utterence (Searle, 1969; Ford and Ford, 1995) .
Incorporating ideas about language use in the study of competitive dynamics is important to advance understanding of how firms compete in markets viewed as interpretative environments where stakeholders allocate resources among competing firms on the basis of their interpretations about firms (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Rindova & Fombrun, 1999; Scott & Lane, 2000; Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001) . By adopting a discourse-sensitive perspective (Grant, Keenoy, & Oswick, 1998; Marshak, Keenoy, Oswick, & Grant, 2000) we draw attention to how linguistic practices are related to organizational actions, competitive dynamics, stakeholders relationships, and ultimately, performance outcomes.
In developing our ideas, we studied closely the dynamics of the "cola war" that took place between Coca Cola and PepsiCo in the 1980s. We use examples from this well-known competitive war throughout the paper to illustrate our ideas. The paper proceeds as follows: We first review how existing perspectives define competitive wars; we then discuss the concept of language games and how it applies to competitive wars; next, we develop an integrative model of the competitive and socio-linguistic processes through which wars are enacted; finally, we conclude with a discussion of the contributions of the paper to research and practice.
COMPETITIVE WARS AS EXTREME RIVALRY
The field of strategy abounds in military terminology, including the term 'strategy' itself (Grant, 1998) and the metaphor of war, which underlies much of current thinking about competitive interactions (Rindfleisch, 1996) . Research in industrial organization economics and game theory, however, has incorporated the term 'competitive war' in more formal theorizing to refer to periods of excessive rivalry. We review this approach to provide a foundation for understanding the economic aspects of competitive wars, including their antecedents, triggers, and consequences.
The industrial organization economics (Mason, 1939; Bain, 1956; Scherer & Ross, 1990 ) research defines competitive wars as a form of extreme, cut-throat competition that results primarily from the structural characteristics of industries. Industry conditions, such as low-growth, excess capacity, large number of competitors with similar relative power, standardized products, and high fixed costs are identified to be among the primary antecedents of warlike competitive behavior (Porter, 1980) .
In contrast, a history of interactions, tacit coordination, multimarket contact, and specific pricing mechanisms (e.g., price leadership or rule-of-thumb pricing) limit rivalry and reduce the likelihood of competitive wars (Porter, 1980; Scherer & Ross, 1990) . Whereas all elements of the marketing mix (products, price, promotions, and placement [Gatignon, Anderson and Helsen, 1989] ) can serve as competitive weapons in a war, price cuts and excessive advertising have received most attention, particularly for their destructive consequences for firm performance. Price wars tend to increase total industry demand and consumer surplus, but they also tend to be detrimental to firm profitability (Scherer & Ross, 1990) . Similarly, excessive advertising tends to destroy wealth when competing firms engage in mutually canceling expenses that result in limited product differentiation, and almost no increase in total industry demand (Netter, 1982) . Therefore, industrial organization economics emphasizes that avoiding price and advertising wars is an important strategic concern for firms.
Competitive dynamics research (Smith, et al., 1992; Ferrier, Smith, & Grimm, 1999) looks at industry rivalry in terms of number and type of actions that firms take to gain competitive advantage, or to respond to competitors' efforts to gain advantage. Smith, et al. (1992) found that better industry performance in the airline industry was associated with lower average number of competitive actions within the industry as a whole. However, at the firm level of analysis, the total number of actions a firm takes tends to be positively associated with firm performance (Young, Smith, & Grimm, 1996; Ferrier, 2001) . Further, taking more actions leads to shifts in competitive positions between leaders and followers (Ferrier et al., 1999) . Temporal attributes of actionresponse sequences, such as speed of competitive response (Bettis & Weeks, 1987) , and duration of competitive attacks (Ferrier, 2001) , also affect firm performance. Thus, according to this research high levels of competitive activity may generate positive consequences for the more aggressive rival, but may also be destructive in the long run, leading to an escalation in competitive responses.
Game theorists view wars as temporary breakdowns in the industry equilibrium. These researchers have suggested that breakdowns in industry equilibria occur due to cheating and retaliation in collusive agreements (Friedman, 1983) , unexpected changes in demand (Porter, 1985; Slade, 1989) , excess capacity (Martin, 1993) , and new entrants, which induce incumbents to take actions to create reputations for toughness (Kreps & Wilson, 1982; Milgrom & Roberts, 1982 Finally, game theorists highlight the temporality of wars as break-downs in equilibrium conditions.
Overall, these perspectives emphasize the negative performance consequences of intensified competitive activity, recognize that it reflects intentions to improve competitive position by damaging one's competitors, and characterize it as a "competitive war."
These conceptualizations of competitive wars, however, equate competitive wars with the observable competitive behavior, and do not explain the processes through which intensified competitive activity is recognized as a "war" in the marketplace. In reality, whereas many industries with oligopolistic structures provide examples of competitive wars (e.g., Coca-Cola and PepsiCo in the General Mills, these firms do not seem to engage in acknowledged warlike conduct. Therefore, research equating intense competitive behavior under structural conditions of high interdependence with competitive wars overlooks real differences in the way competing firms interact.
How do competitive wars differ from the more general case of intense competition? We argue that competitive wars are enacted through participation in a "war language game." The war language game defines the competitive reality inside, and between, rivaling firms in war-related terms. In the following section we discuss the concept of language games and how it can be used to understand competitive wars.
COMPETITIVE WARS AS ACTIONS EMBEDDED IN A LANGUAGE GAME
The metaphor of war has been frequently invoked by both business scholars and business practitioners to describe the competitive activities of firms (Kotler & Singh, 1981; Hunt & Menon, 1995; Rindfleisch, 1996) . Business scholars have argued that this metaphor is substantive, in that the theoretical knowledge developed in the domain of military science can be usefully transferred to the study and management of competitive interactions (Hunt & Menon, 1995) .
In constructing the reality of a competitive war, however, rivaling firms go beyond simply invoking the metaphor of war. They use military language to describe many aspects of their competitive activities. For example, at PepsiCo, bottlers were rewarded as "veterans in the war against Coca-Cola," and for "invading" markets with new "sales weapons" (Watters, 1978 , cited in Wayland & Porter, 1993 . We argue that such systematic use of military language to characterize the practices of competition as warlike activities constitutes a "war language game." Wittgenstein (1953) used the term "language game" to convey the idea that the meaning of words is defined through their use in social interactions. 2 He compared words to tools, and to "instruments for particular uses" (Wittgenstein, 1953: 291) because in his view, words not only name objects, but also imply the appropriate actions to be taken toward these objects (Perry, 1994) .
Thus, in a langauge game words and actions are closely related because the meaning of words is understood when an appropriate action is taken. While the words in a language game call for taking an action, the rules of the game define what constitutes appropriate actions by specifying the correspondence between words and actions (Wittgenstein, 1953, remark 53-54) . Rules are repositories of social practice. They are patterns of "regularity," which are taught to new participants in the game "by means of examples and by practice" (Wittgenstein, 1953: 70 [italics language game generating intensified competitive activity.
HOW COMPETITIVE WARS ARE ENACTED
The framework we propose seeks to illustrate how, as firms engage in a war language game, socio-linguistic processes and economic processes intertwine to redefine the behaviors for internal and external stakeholders. The war language game affects the allocation of attention -both at the organizational and market levels. Changes in attention and interpretation (including changes in the emotional processing of information about firms) lead stakeholders to respond to firms' actions more intensely and proactively, to become involved in the war language game themselves, and to allocate resources in ways that contribute to the performance consequences of the war. Once performance changes occur, the balance between the costs of waging a war and the benefits of increased stakeholder support begins to tip, creating incentives for the competitive activity in the industry to return to its normal levels.
In this section we discuss in detail four processes that describe how a competitive war is enacted as a language game: developing an "enemy mindset" inside rivaling firms, intensifying competitive activity by these firms in the marketplace, marshalling stakeholder support, and responding to changes in demand and performance for the rivaling firms, and the industry as a whole. Developing an "enemy mindset" and marshalling stakeholder support are processes that reflect the changing interpretations and practices of rivaling firms and external stakeholders as participants in the war language game. Intensifying competitive activity and shifting demand are economic processes that reflect changing allocation of resources by rivaling firms and stakeholders.
These interpretative and economic processes reinforce each other as a competitive war builds up, reaches its peak, and ebbs, and competition returns to normal levels. 
Antecedents of Competitive Wars
Existing research has suggested that external industry shocks lead to the outbreak of competitive wars. In particular, game theorists have studied various "trigger events" that generate price wars in industries with oligopolistic structures (Martin, 1993) . For instance, Robert Porter (1983 has shown that price wars tend to occur after unexpected drops in demand. This idea has been expanded to include market booms (Rotemberg & Saloner, 1986 ) and infrequent random shifts in demand (Slade, 1989) . Price wars may also occur because a firm is seeking to deter other firms from breaking a collusive industry agreement (Porter, 1983) , because a collusive agreement has actually broken down (Rosenbaum, 1986) , or because a firm is trying to resolve uncertainty about new levels of demand and/or costs structures of competitors (Martin, 1993) . In all these instances, following an external shock, at least one firm in an industry experiences a decline in its market position or, in the case of demand booms, sees an opportunity to improve its position.
The traditional view of wars as extreme rivalry emphasizes that under conditions of high interdependence (e.g., in oligopolistic industries), performance improvements for one player are closely matched by performance declines for another. For example, Tollison, Kaplan, and Higgins (1991) report that two thirds of the bimonthly market share changes of Coke and Pepsi in the most important areas of the U.S. from December 1984 to July 1989 were in opposite direction for the two rivals. Under such conditions, the perceived opportunity to improve, or to defend, a competitive position at the expense of a rival, ultimately motivate competitive warfare (Porter, 1980) . These ideas from industrial organization economics and game theory suggest the following baseline proposition about the antecedent conditions of competitive wars:
Proposition 1: Under conditions of interdependence, a firm is likely to engage in a war with a rival if it perceives a decline in, or an opportunity to improve, its relative competitive position.
Developing an Enemy Mindset
According to game theorists, changes in a firm's level of sales confront the firm with an "inference problem" about whether the changes in performance are a result of competitors' actions, or of exogenous changes in industry demand (Porter, 1985) . The inference problem identified by game theorists refers to the need for firms to attribute some underlying causes to the changes in performance. Causal analysis, defined as the effort to identify what factors give rise to what outcomes, is a core cognitive process (Fiske & Taylor, 1991) , which becomes more conscious and deliberate when people experience unexpected or negative outcomes that challenge their expectations and beliefs (Hastie, 1984; Weiner, 1985) .
Although people attribute causes to events in order to be better able to control and manage their environments, the attribution process is subject to systematic biases (Miller & Ross, 1975; Ross, 1977) . Among the various biases documented by research in social cognition, several may be particularly useful to understanding competitive interactions. The tendency of people to take credit for success and to deny responsibility for negative outcomes is known as "the self-serving attribution bias" (Miller & Ross, 1975) . In the case of interacting groups, such as rivaling firms, this bias manifests itself as a tendency of in-group members to attribute positive in-group behaviors and negative out-group behaviors to internal causes, and negative in-group behaviors and positive outgroup behaviors to external causes (Hewstone & Jaspars, 1982) . Applied to competitive interactions this logic suggests that competing firms are likely not only to attribute negative performance outcomes to the actions of a competitor, but also to attribute these actions to internal dispositional characteristics of the competitor. Combined with what is known as the fundamental attribution error -the tendency of individuals to attribute the actions of others to their dispositional qualities (Heider, 1958; Ross, 1977 ) -these attribution tendencies are likely to lead to the construal of a competitor as an enemy-rival, or a competitor with an intent to damage the firm. The forgoing discussion suggests the following proposition:
Proposition 2a: A firm that experiences negative performance outcomes is likely to attribute a harmful intention to the actions of one or several competitors, and to construe the competitor(s) as enemy-rival(s).
The attributions discussed above have been traditionally viewed as based on individual cognitive processes (Heider, 1958; Ross, 1977) , but recent attribution research has recognized that attributions develop through processes of social interaction and communication (Hewstone, 1983; Semin & Manstead, 1984) . According to Fiske & Taylor (1991: 63) "research has made clear that much causal inference must be understood not solely as the inner workings of the mind attempting to impose causal order on ambiguity, but also as a social process by which people solicit causal explanations from others and communicate their explanations to others." Thus, in constructing a causal understanding of their changing competitive environment, firms engage-consciously or subconsciously (Marshak et al., 2000) Such descriptions focus organizational attention and activities on the relationship between the firm and the enemy-rival. Attentional processes further "focus the energy, effort, and mindfulness of decision makers on a limited set of elements that enter into their consciousness at any given time. Focused attention both facilitates perception and action towards those issues and activities being attended to, and inhibits perception, and action towards those that are not." (Kahneman, 1973 , cited in Ocasio, 1997 As a result, organizational decision makers are likely to dedicate increasing amounts of time, effort, and internal resources to the issues, emphasized by the war language game, and to the actions suggested by it, such as fighting back and defeating the enemy.
Since the rules of the war language game increase the legitimacy, value, and relevance of defeating the enemy, actions related to the enemy gain higher priority. For example, an "us-versusthem" rule increases members' identification with the group, and mobilizes them to achieve group goals. The war language game motivates both individual and firm-level behaviors that are focused on the enemy-rival. Overall, internally the war language game creates a socio-linguistic context, which we term an "enemy mindset" within which organizational actions and resources are increasingly directed toward dealing with the enemy-rival.
Because linguistic practices and competitive actions are closely intertwined in a language game, the greater levels of resource commitments made to enemy-directed activities, in turn call for stronger justification of these commitments, and create the need for more extensive and pervasive use of military language. The war language game spreads to encompass an increasingly broader range of organizational activities, reinforcing the development of the enemy mindset. This positive feedback effect between the use of military language and the allocation of firm resources could lead firms to an escalation of commitment to the point of undermining the achievement of other firm goals, as the goal of beating the enemy begins to attract disproportionate level of resources.
Therefore, whereas the development of an enemy mindset serves to mobilize resources for taking action against the enemy-rival, it may also divert resources from other uses. The positive feedback loop contributes to the temporality of wars, since it creates an imbalance in the use of resources, which must be corrected eventually.
Therefore, we propose that:
Proposition 2b: A firm that construes a competitor as an enemy-rival, is more likely to develop an enemy mindset that leads to greater levels of resources allocation and competitive actions targeted at the enemy-rival.
Intensifying Competitive Activity
The enemy mindset, characterized by the focus of organizational attention on a rival, has important consequences inside the firm, as well as for the firm's conduct in the market. As attention and resources inside a firm shift to focus on an enemy-rival, the firm is likely to intensify its competitive activity targeted against the rival.
According to competitive dynamics research, three attributes of competitive actions define the level of intensity of competitive activity (Smith, Ferrier, & Ndofor, 2001 ). The attributes are frequency (i.e., number of actions taken), magnitude (i.e., resources committed to each action), and variety (i.e., the different types of actions taken) of competitive actions. The shifting levels of attention and resources directed to an enemy-rival are likely to affect all three attributes of competitive activity as discussed below.
Waging a war is likely to be associated with a greater number of actions, since actions are the primary mechanism through which firms gain and sustain competitive positions in the market (Young et al., 1996) . Taking more actions impedes the effectiveness of competitive response because it is harder for a competitor to respond to more actions. Internally, the war language game justifies the greater allocation of resources to carrying out a higher number of competitive actions.
The cola war in the 1980s provides an example of how the level of competitive activity changes during a competitive war. Using the F&S Predicast database used by competitive dynamics researchers (Ferrier, et al., 1999) In addition to an increase in number of actions, it is also likely that warring rivals increase the magnitude of their actions, since the enemy mindset leads decision makers to assign higher value and priority to issues related to fighting the rival. In the case of the 'cola war" in the 1980s, the increase in the number of actions taken by Coca Cola and PepsiCo in the late-80s was accompanied 5 1994 is the last year for which F&S Predicast is available in print and information on actions can be collected from a comparable source.
by an increase in the magnitude of their actions. For instance, both firms increased their advertising budgets substantially. PepsiCo, in particular, began using highly paid celebrities, such as Michael Jackson, which according to observers changed the nature and the stakes of advertising efforts in the industry.
Increased attention and resource availability for taking actions against the enemy-rival are also likely to lead to greater variety of actions being taken in an effort to surprise and outmaneuver the rival. Greater variety of actions increases their unpredictability (Ferrier, 2001 ), which in turn increases the probability of victory since it is difficult to fight well on multiple fronts. In the case of the cola war, Coca-Cola quickly imitated PepsiCo's new type of celebrity advertising. Both firms actively launched new products, and changed packaging sizes and designs, in addition to restructuring their relationships with bottlers (Foley & Yoffie, 1994) . Therefore, we expect that a firm engaged in a competitive war will take more actions, will take actions of greater magnitude, and will take a wider variety of actions, thus intensifying its competitive activity on all three dimensions discussed above.
Finally, intensified competitive activity on behalf of one of the rivals generally promotes intensified competitive activity by the other rival. One reason for this is the interdependence of firms in industries with oligopolistic structures, where competitors tend to monitor each others' actions, exchange information, and follow pricing leads from the industry leader (Scherer & Ross, 1990) . Another reason that becomes apparent when wars are viewed through linguistic lenses is that, the war language game becomes the socio-linguistic context within which the actions of competing firms are communicated and understood, both internally and externally. As a result, the second rival is also likely to engage in the war language game, and to take actions accordingly.
Overall, intensified competitive activity on behalf of one rival is likely to lead to reciprocated competitive activity by the other rival, resulting in an overall heightened level of competitive activity between two rivals.
Based on the ideas discussed in this section, we propose that:
Proposition 3a: The more a firm develops an enemy mindset, the more likely it is to take a greater number of actions, actions with greater magnitude, and more varied actions targeted at the enemy-rival.
Proposition 3b: The greater the intensification of activity on behalf of one rival, the more likely that the other rival will also develop an enemy mindset, and intensify competitive activity in turn.
Marshalling Stakeholder Support
Past competitive dynamics research has focused on the effects of intensified competitive activity on competitors. However, firms' strategic actions also affect how their external stakeholders, such as customers, investors, regulators, and the media, perceive and evaluate them (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Jones, 1995; Donaldson & Preston, 1995) . Stakeholders form impressions of firms on the bases of their actions, and communications (Rindova & Fombrun, 1999; Scott & Lane, 2000) . As firms engage in a war language game, they are likely to increasingly use military terms in their communications with stakeholders, and the war language game to infiltrate the interactions between firms and their external stakeholders.
As a result, the relationship between warring firms and their stakeholders is likely to be influenced both by the intensified competitive activity --with its economic and interpretative consequences for various stakeholders --and by the use of military language. The intensified competitive activity and the military language are likely to affect the salience and vividness of the information about firms. Salience and vividness are important in attracting stakeholder attention, because unlike organizational members, whose attention is hierarchically and structurally focused on the issues, which organizational practices make important (Ocasio, 1997) , the attention that external stakeholders allocate to firms depends primarily on the extent to which information about the firm is salient and inherently attention-grabbing (Fiske & Taylor, 1991) . Intensified competitive activity presents stakeholders with information stimuli that are salient due to higher frequency and greater magnitude of actions. Salient stimuli elicit greater levels of attention, increase perceived prominence, and make evaluations more extreme. These cognitive effects interact positively with the effects of engaging external stakeholders into a war language game, in that the war language game makes these stimuli more vivid by making them more emotionally-interesting and concrete (Nisbett and Ross, 1980) . Vivid stimuli, in turn, generate greater levels of attention and emotional involvement on behalf of stakeholders.
The effects of the war language game, however, extend beyond enhancing the vividness of the competitive activity as information stimuli. They affect the behaviors, in which stakeholders are likely to engage as participants in the war language game. As external stakeholders seek to make sense of firms' strategic actions, they begin to use the labels supplied by the firms to describe their activities. One of the consequences of language games is that "when human beings agree in a language they speak, they agree in a form of life" (Smart, 1957) . Thus, as a result of participating in a war language game, stakeholders may be more receptive, supportive, or susceptible to the strategies of the rivaling firms. Such effects on stakeholder acceptance of firms' strategies are important since the intensified competitive activity of the two rivals may lead to perceptions of predatory competitive behavior vis-à-vis smaller firms in the industry (as some observers have noted in the case of Wal-Mart). In addition, gaining stakeholders' acceptance through their participation in the war language game may also be important because in many industries other players, such as advocacy groups, may initiate their own language games to delegitimize the activities of firms (see Livesey, 2001 for an example of a language game contests between Royal/Dutch Shell and GreenPeace). Thus, stakeholder participation in a language game initiated by the rivaling firms may be a factor contributing to the legitimacy of these firms' strategies.
Further, the war language game may influence stakeholders in less conscious ways (Marshak et al., 2000) . For example, the war language game deploys vocabulary related to "winning and losing" and "taking sides" which implies behaviors of manifesting loyalty (or at least, determining with which rival one's loyalty lies). In addition, these manifestations may take more extreme forms, befitting the reality constructed within the war language game. For example, consumers responded to the introduction of "New Coke" in response to the Pepsi Challenge campaign (considered by many the trigger event for the cola war in the 1980s) by staging public demonstrations in front of Coca Cola´s headquarters in Atlanta.
Overall, the intensified competitive activity embedded in a war language game affects the relationship between rivaling firms and their external stakeholders. The combination of intensified competitive activity and the war language game attract greater levels of market attention by making the information about the rivaling firms more salient and vivid. Further, the war language game is likely to generate greater levels of emotional involvement on behalf of external stakeholders, such as customers, and to prompt them to engage in dramatic displays of support. Finally, the participation of stakeholders in the language game may lead to their implicit agreement with the competitive actions of rivaling firms, and the broader consequences of these actions, including potential negative effects on other players. The degree to which external stakeholders will participate in the language game and will become emotionally involved with the rivaling firms will vary with their stakeholder roles (e.g., customers versus the media), as well as the degree of their personal identification with a given firm (Scott & Lane, 2000) . Based on the ideas discussed in this section, we propose that:
Proposition 4a: The more embedded the intensified competitive activity of a firm is in a war language game, the more stakeholder attention and support the firm will attract.
Proposition 4b: The greater the participation of stakeholders in the war language game, the greater the extent of their acceptance of and emotional involvement with the rivaling firms.
Changes in Demand and Performance
Examining the interpretative dynamics surrounding competitive wars, and particularly the effects of a war language game on stakeholders, explains why competitive wars may have positive performance consequences in some cases. This expectation contrasts with the traditional view in strategic management, which has focused on the negative performance consequences for the participating firms and the industry as a whole (Porter, 1980; Smith, et al., 1992) . (Enrico, 1988 , cited in Foley & Yoffie, 1994 .
Overall, some competitive wars will have a negative effect on all industry players (particularly price wars), while others will benefit the warring rivals at the expense of their nonparticipating competitors, and yet others may potentially have a positive effect on the entire industry. The outcomes of a competitive war depend, at least in part, on the combined effects of competitive actions and the language game on external stakeholders. By taking in account the positive effects of internal resource mobilization and stakeholder attention and involvement, the consequences of competitive wars should not be expected to be uniformly negative, and competitive wars should not be considered anomalous competitive behavior. Based on these ideas we propose that:
Proposition 5: The performance of the rivaling firms engaged in a competitive war will decrease if the relative costs of intensified competitive activity outweigh the benefits of increased internal resource mobilization and external stakeholder support.
Return to Normal Competition
So far we made the argument that wars begin with an exogenous shock that affects firm performance. Attributing negative performance changes to adversarial intent on behalf of an enemy-rival, leads to the development of an enemy mindset and to intensified competitive activity toward that rival. The enemy mindset develops through participation in a language game, which is also extended through communications to external stakeholders. The combination of intensified competitive activity and the war language game enable firms to marshal greater levels of stakeholder support, resulting in positive changes in the performance of one or both rivals. Changes in performance, if substantial, can affect the structure of the industry, including industry concentration and relative competitive positions.
Once such changes have taken place, the opportunities for further changes in competitive positions and performance through the war may decrease. For example, by the end of the 1980s and early 1990s, the combined market share of the two rivals in the cola war exceeded 70%, and the per capita consumption had increased from 34.5 gallons per capita in 1981 to 48 gallons per capita in 1992 (Foley & Yoffie, 1994) . As a result of such changes, performance may improve at a diminishing rate, thus decreasing the incentives for the rivals to continue the war. Further, due to the escalation dynamics associated with the enemy mindset, the costs of intensified, enemy-directed, competitive activity are likely to increase, thus, creating incentives to reduce such competitive activity, and to disengage from the enemy mindset. The disengagement from the enemy mindset leads to de-escalation of competitive activity to the normal level expected for a given industry structure. In the process of de-escalation firms direct their actions toward markets with lower level of competitive contact, where their actions are less likely to be considered threatening and to provoke a competitive response (Chen & MacMillan, 1992 (Ferraro, 1992) . Thus, the cola war in the 1980s ended as the two rivals disengaged from fighting each other in the U.S., and directed their efforts to international markets. However, as rivaling firms change their strategies to improve their positions in these new markets, attribution processes may trigger a new cycle of a competitive war in these markets. For example, in the early 1990s, PepsiCo executives made statements that PepsiCo was planning to take the cola war globally (Food & Drink Daily, 1995) .
DISCUSSION
Existing research treats competitive wars as cases of extreme rivalry. To understand wars, scholars in industrial organization economics, competitive dynamics, and game theory have examined economic conditions, such as industry structural characteristics and industry exogenous shocks. These researchers have generally recommended that wars should be avoided because they leave all industry players worse off (Porter, 1980; Smith, et al., 1992) . Despite the important contributions of these streams of research to our understanding of intensified rivalry as one of the key elements of competitive wars, we have argued that competitive wars are more complex phenomena, including socio-linguistic processes of engaging internal and external stakeholders in a war language game. Failing to account for the socio-linguistic processes that surround competitive wars makes our understanding of competitive wars incomplete and potentially inaccurate (e.g., the presumed exclusively negative performance consequences of wars.)
Drawing on research in social cognition and linguistics, in this paper we propose that competitive wars are better understood as a language game manifest in intensified competitive activity. Our perspective extends traditional views of competitive wars, which have emphasized only observable characteristics of industry structure and competitive conduct, by underscoring the role of language in constructing the context within which observable competitive conduct becomes a competitive "war." Our model emphasizes that the war language game not only labels the competitive activity as "war", but it also legitimizes, focuses, and builds up the aggressive behavior that characterizes competitive wars. The model also recognizes that the war language game affects attribution and attentional processes inside firms and in markets that lead to the development of an enemy mindset inside rivaling firms, as well as marshalling of external stakeholders support. By suggesting how language provides a guide for action and how actions acquire meaning, our model not only emphasizes the need for linguistic analysis in the study of competitive wars, but highlights more broadly the intangible, meaning-related, aspects of market interactions.
The model we propose advances two main areas in strategy and organization research. First, it adds to a growing body of research that views markets as interpretative environments (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Suchman, 1995; Rindova & Fombrun, 1999) . It extends this research by drawing attention to the role of language games in shaping organizational processes, competitive conduct, and stakeholder relationships. Second, the model contributes to research on competitive dynamics (Smith et al, 1992; Ferrier et al., 1999) by suggesting how competitive actions and the language in which they are embedded jointly shape the perceptions and experiences of stakeholders inside and outside firms. Below we discuss the implications of our model for future research in these two areas and for management practice.
Implications for research on the role of language in market processes. In the last decade, there has been an increased interest in the role of language in organizations (Ford & Ford, 1995; Hatch, 1993 Hatch, , 1997 Phillips, 1995; Dunford & Palmer, 1996; Alvesson & Käremann, 2000) , and a burgeoning interest in the role of language in markets (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001 ).
Research in the latter group has been concerned primarily with how language affects the ability of firms to gain legitimacy vis-à-vis stakeholders (Elsbach, 1994; Lamertz & Baum, 1998) . In this paper we extend this research by suggesting how social interactions are shaped by participation in a language game, and how the language game affects both the competitive activity of firms, and stakeholders' responses.
Whereas the concept of language games is central in the philosophy of language (Feyerabend, 1955; Smart, 1957; DeRose, 1992; Perry, 1994) , it has been applied to the study of organizational phenomena in a rather limited fashion, primarily to highlight the constructive role of language (e.g. (Astley & Zammuto, 1992; Mauws & Philips 1995; Boland et al., 2001; Livesey, 2001) .
In this paper, we build on the concept of language games to develop an integrative model, which describes how context, action, and language reciprocally affect each other. The model allows us to study more comprehensively a phenomenon that has been examined primarily as a function of competitive actions.
By using the concept of language games we also seek to challenge the simplistic view of corporate communications as a tool for manipulation of messages and symbols (Pfeffer, 1981; Scott & Lane, 2000) . Such approaches are more closely rooted in a concept of communication as rhetoric, where the effects of language are predicated on its power to produce targeted emotional responses.
As Hardy et al. (2000 Hardy et al. ( : 1231 have argued: "The work that conceptualizes strategy as rhetoric is vulnerable to the criticism that it says little about how talk produces action." In contrast, the concept of language games recognizes the emotional effects of language, but focuses on how language and actions are intertwined.
Finally, we hope to spur future research interest in the application of the concept of language games to understanding various organizational and market phenomena, where social actors pursue outcomes through the simultaneous deployment of linguistic and non-linguistic means. In this paper we focused on competitive wars as one type of competitive phenomenon that is enacted through the combined effects of language and strategic action. This example demonstrates that, if strategy research adheres to the traditional views in industrial organization economics about communications as "cheap talk" (Scherer & Ross, 1990) , important aspects of competitive phenomena are likely to be overlooked. Many competitive phenomena in strategy, including formation of strategic groups, emergence of industry niches, definition of geographic clusters, and market bubbles, await examination through linguistic lenses. In fact, as Ford and Ford (1995) have suggested, all processes of intentional change can be understood as processes of communication.
Overall, strategy research can benefit from the study of the intended and unintended effects of language on mobilization of resources inside and around firms, and across various industry contexts.
The relative novelty of the concept of language games to strategy and organizational research suggests that much future research is needed to specify how language games operate in organizations and markets. Future research should focus on studying how specific language games are initiated in organizations or larger collectives, such as industry groups or organizational fields.
Specifically, we need to understand how language games are activated or abated, and to what extent organizational actors select among multiple language games as a guide for action.
Implications for research on competitive dynamics. Our model also contributes new ideas to research on competitive dynamics. This paradigm has generated a sizable body of research and has amassed significant evidence regarding the performance consequences of competitive actions (Young et al., 1996) . However, this research has not examined the processes through which different types of actions generate different consequences. In particular, it has not studied the relationship between actions, language, and interpretations.
Our model articulates how communication and action interweave to jointly generate the processes and consequences of competitive wars. The concept of language games emphasizes both how language generates action -e.g., a war language game enhances aggressiveness, extremity, and determination in taking action -and how the language used stimulates certain behaviors and discourages others (Ashforth & Humphry, 1997) . Future research should focus on studying more closely how language enables firms to communicate strategic themes (Barry & Elmes, 1997) , and how the language used creates a reality, which further commits firms to a given course of action.
In a related vein, strategy research can seek to further explore the role of language in defining strategic actions as meaningful patterns. Current research has begun to recognize that competitive dynamics consist of sequences, such as "attacks" (Ferrier, 2001 ) rather than the relatively simple action-reaction dyads, which have been studied in the past. In our view, future research in this area should go beyond competitive attacks, and begin to analyze strategic themes in patterns of competitive interactions by attending to the language games, of which competitive interactions form a part.
Further, the thematic consistency that a language game provides also affects the interpretation of a firm's strategy by stakeholders, in ways similar to the ways researchers have identified for story-telling (Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001 ). In our view, organizational stories, and language games may be different, but complementary ways through which firms project their perspective, worldview, or logic in the marketplace. For example, Aldrich and Fiol (1994) proposed that entrepreneurs use both language and stories to change patterns of meaning in their environments. Future research is needed to specify how these different aspects of firm communications interact and how effective they are in different strategic situations.
Implications for Practice. Our model has important implications for managers both in industries
where competitive interactions become "wars", and in industries where they do not. The model emphasizes that competitive wars are enacted --they are not simply triggered by industry conditions, but are also staged by managers seeking to achieve certain performance objectives relative to their rivals. In particular, we explained how participation in a war language game creates "wars" in industries, which in turn affect the distribution of resources and the relative performance of competing firms in an industry.
In addition, the model suggests that the war language game also affects stakeholder interest and involvement, which are important determinants of the performance consequences of a competitive war. Therefore, managers should consider strategies for spreading the war language game among various stakeholders as part of their war plans. In doing so, managers should recognize that processes that involve diffused stakeholder groups may generate their own self-propagating dynamics, and that increasing stakeholder participation often also increases stakeholder power (Scott & Lane, 2000) .
Our model also emphasizes that competitive wars are not necessarily anomalous, and invariably destructive competitive phenomena, because they include a process of marshalling stakeholder support. This process describes the potential competitive benefits of greater levels of attention, emotional involvement, and acceptance by stakeholders, such as employees and customers. It also underscores the fact that the potential beneficiaries of a competitive war are only the firms that participate in it, and raises the question whether neutrality is a good strategy in the context of strategic warfare.
The concept of a war language game, on which our model is based, stresses the power of language to create reality. As a result, organizations may find themselves operating in contexts different from those initially intended. For example, decision makers may escalate in commitment to beat an enemy-rival, and external stakeholders may develop expectations for a firm to take actions to win, rather than to compete at the optimal level of profitability. Similarly, once actors engage in a war language game they may have limited ability to reverse the process, and to draw upon alternative root metaphors to mobilize action (Dunford & Palmer, 1996) . To avoid such unintended consequences of the language they use, managers must recognize the behavioral consequences of language games, and their role in enacting competitive wars.
Conclusion
This paper addresses the topic of competitive wars, which albeit frequently occurring events in markets, have not received much attention in strategy research. The paper combines ideas from economics, linguistics, and social cognition to present an integrative model of competitive wars in order to advance understanding of this phenomenon beyond its current treatment as a metaphor for high rivalry. The concept of "language games" on which we base the model suggests that language and action intertwine to generate the processes and consequences of competitive wars. Further, the model stresses how language, subtly but pervasively, shapes the competitive reality both inside and around rivaling firms, and suggests that by attending to the constructive power of language, researchers and managers alike can better cope with the complexities of current market environments, where the pursuit of meaning and competitive advantage are closely intertwined.
